Today we’re releasing a three-part series about how the U.S. has dealt with the bioterrorism threat during the Bush administration. Our reporting, done in collaboration with Reader’s Digest and multimedia magazine FLYP Media, found that the $48 billion the government has spent fighting bioterrorism over the past seven years might actually have accelerated the risk of an attack while making only modest progress in preparing for one. Earlier this week, a bipartisan commission found that a biological terrorist attack is likely somewhere in the world within the next five years. Like the congressionally mandated commission, ProPublica found that major changes are necessary in the nation’s approach to containing the threat of bioterrorism. Check out the entire ProPublica series. |
Basically, the argument is that, by increasing the number of labs that handle bioweapons, you increase the risk of a bioweapon either being used or released by error.
“The simplest, most likely path for an individual or group to acquire a bioweapons capability is to obtain bioweapons agents and training by penetration of a U.S. bioweapons-agents research project,” said Richard H. Ebright, a scientist at the Waksman Institute of Microbiology at Rutgers University in New Jersey. “One well-placed graduate student, post-doctoral fellow or technician... It’s only a matter of time.”
“The simplest, most likely path for an individual or group to acquire a bioweapons capability is to obtain bioweapons agents and training by penetration of a U.S. bioweapons-agents research project,” said Richard H. Ebright, a scientist at the Waksman Institute of Microbiology at Rutgers University in New Jersey. “One well-placed graduate student, post-doctoral fellow or technician... It’s only a matter of time.”
